Biological agents of bioterrorism - preparedness is vital.

Bioterrorist threats and attacks are still an issue of concern in the world. Biological agents are divided into three categories. The highest priority agents classified in category A pose a massive risk to public health and national security. The society should be prepared for this risk. Health professionals in the Czech Republic should be aware of the diseases caused by category A agents, which are not common in the country. In this context, the project of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic “Decontamination of the injured persons” has been implemented at the Faculty of Health Sciences, Palacký University, Olomouc. The article provides an overview of selected serious infectious risks and information on the project the aim of which is to create certified methodical procedures and guidelines on situations related to bioterrorism.

Real-Time Monitoring of a Botulinum Neurotoxin Using All-Carbon Nanotube-Based Field-Effect Transistor Devices.

The possibility of exposure to botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT), a powerful and potential bioterrorism agent, is considered to be ever increasing. The current gold-standard assay, live-mouse lethality, exhibits high sensitivity but has limitations including long assay times, whereas other assays evince rapidity but lack factors such as real-time monitoring or portability. In this study, we aimed to devise a novel detection system that could detect BoNT at below-nanomolar concentrations in the form of a stretchable biosensor. We used a field-effect transistor with a p-type channel and electrodes, along with a channel comprising aligned carbon nanotube layers to detect the type E light chain of BoNT (BoNT/E-Lc). The detection of BoNT/E-Lc entailed observing the cleavage of a unique peptide and the specific bonding between BoNT/E-Lc and antibody BoNT/E-Lc (Anti-BoNT/E-Lc). The unique peptide was cleaved by 60 pM BoNT/E-Lc; notably, 52 fM BoNT/E-Lc was detected within 1 min in the device with the antibody in the bent state. These results demonstrated that an all-carbon nanotube-based device (all-CNT-based device) could be produced without a complicated fabrication process and could be used as a biosensor with high sensitivity, suggesting its potential development as a wearable BoNT biosensor.

Abordando la problemática de las armas biológicas en el siglo XXI: el papel de una red de prevención 2.0 / No disponible

El uso estratégico de la enfermedad en la guerra ha demostrado ser una amenaza para la humanidad desde hace mucho tiempo; sin embargo, la naturaleza cambiante tanto de la ciencia como de Ia seguridad tiene, al combinarse, el potencial idóneo para estimular la adopción de nuevas (y clásicas) armas biológicas. Este breve artículo se inicia con la descripcion de algunos de estos cambios antes de considerar los medios y las medidas establecidas para hacer frente al desafío de las armas biológicas. Posteriormente, se procederá a delinear una red de prevención 2.0, compuesta por hebras que se refuerzan mutuamente, con la que se pretende formar un marco para un enfoque más holistico que sirva para hacer frente al desafío de las armas biológicas en el siglo XXI (AU)

The strategic use of disease in Warfare has long proven a menace to humankind; however, the changing nature of both science and security has the potential to encourage the assimilation of new (and old) biological weapons. This short article begins by outlining some of these changes before considering the means and measures in place to deal with the challenge of biological weapons. It proceeds to outline a Web of Prevention 2.0, comprised of mutually reinforcing strands that are intended to form a framework for a more holistic approach to dealing with the challenge of biological Weapons around the globe ln the 21st century (AU)

Biopreparedness in the Age of Genetically Engineered Pathogens and Open Access Science: An Urgent Need for a Paradigm Shift.

Our systems, thinking, training, legislation, and policies are lagging far behind momentous changes in science, and leaving us vulnerable in biosecurity. Synthetic viruses and genetic engineering of pathogens are a reality, with a rapid acceleration of dual-use science. The public availability of methods for dual-use genetic engineering, coupled with the insider threat, poses an unprecedented risk for biosecurity. Case studies including the 1984 Rajneesh salmonella bioterrorism attack and the controversy over engineered transmissible H5N1 influenza are analyzed. Simple probability analysis shows that the risks of dual-use research are likely to outweigh potential benefits, yet this type of analysis has not been done to date. Many bioterrorism agents may also occur naturally. Distinguishing natural from unnatural epidemics is far more difficult than other types of terrorism. Public health systems do not have mechanisms for routinely considering bioterrorism, and an organizational culture that is reluctant to consider it. A collaborative model for flagging aberrant outbreak patterns and referral from the health to security sectors is proposed. Vulnerabilities in current approaches to biosecurity need to be reviewed and strengthened collaboratively by all stakeholders. New systems, legislation, collaborative operational models, and ways of thinking are required to effectively address the threat to global biosecurity.

Medical countermeasures for national security: a new government role in the pharmaceuticalization of society.

How do governments contribute to the pharmaceuticalization of society? Whilst the pivotal role of industry is extensively documented, this article shows that governments too are accelerating, intensifying and opening up new trajectories of pharmaceuticalization in society. Governments are becoming more deeply invested in pharmaceuticals because their national security strategies now aspire to defend populations against health-based threats like bioterrorism and pandemics. To counter those threats, governments are acquiring and stockpiling a panoply of 'medical countermeasures' such as antivirals, next-generation vaccines, antibiotics and anti-toxins. More than that, governments are actively incentivizing the development of many new medical countermeasures--principally by marshaling the state's unique powers to introduce exceptional measures in the name of protecting national security. At least five extraordinary policy interventions have been introduced by governments with the aim of stimulating the commercial development of novel medical countermeasures: (1) allocating earmarked public funds, (2) granting comprehensive legal protections to pharmaceutical companies against injury compensation claims, (3) introducing bespoke pathways for regulatory approval, (4) instantiating extraordinary emergency use procedures allowing for the use of unapproved medicines, and (5) designing innovative logistical distribution systems for mass drug administration outside of clinical settings. Those combined efforts, the article argues, are spawning a new, government-led and quite exceptional medical countermeasure regime operating beyond the conventional boundaries of pharmaceutical development and regulation. In the first comprehensive analysis of the pharmaceuticalization dynamics at play in national security policy, this article unearths the detailed array of policy interventions through which governments too are becoming more deeply imbricated in the pharmaceuticalization of society.

Protecting public health in the age of emerging infections.

Emerging and re-emerging infections cause huge concern among public health workers and international and national bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH). Indeed, scientists around the world express the view that despite the danger, research on these emerging virulent pathogens is crucial and must continue. While most of the studies underway are targeted at improving and protecting public health, some studies bear potentiallyserious risks resulting from misuse. These studies are defined as dual-use research of concern (DURC), where it is not evident that the benefits outweigh the risks. The H5N1 controversy has pushed various governments to institute new policies to govern such research. We describe the regulations that govern this emerging field of research in the United States and Israel, two countries that have taken leading stands on these issues. We suggest that the existing policies are able to mitigate many of the risks that this research encapsulates, yet more work is required--especially on the global level.

Historical perspective on agroterrorism: lessons learned from 1945 to 2012.

This article presents a historical perspective on agroterrorism cases from 1945 until 2012. The threat groups and perpetrators associated with bio- and agroterrorism are clustered into several groups: apocalyptic sects, lone wolves, political groups, and religious groups. We used open-source information, and 4 biological agroterrorism cases are described: (1) in 1952, Mau Mau poisoned cattle in Kenya by using a plant toxin from the African milk bush plant; (2) in 1985, the USDA claimed that Mexican contract workers were involved in deliberately spreading screwworm (Cochliomyia hominivorax) among livestock; (3) in 2000, Palestinian media reported that Israeli settlers released sewer water into Palestinian agricultural fields; and (4) in 2011, a person was sentenced to prison after threatening US and UK livestock with the deliberate spread of foot-and-mouth disease virus. All 4 cases can be assigned to political groups. These cases have not attracted much attention in literature nor in the public media, and the credibility of the sources of information varies. We concluded that agroterrorism has not been a problem during the period studied. Lessons learned from the few cases have generated awareness about the fact that nontypical biological weapons and non-high-risk agents, such as African milk bush, screwworm, and sewer water, have been used by attackers to influence local decision makers. This review will be useful in improving future preparedness planning and developing countermeasures.

Bioterrorism: pathogens as weapons.

Biowarfare has been used for centuries. The use of biological weapons in terrorism remains a threat. Biological weapons include infectious agents (pathogens) and toxins. The most devastating bioterrorism scenario would be the airborne dispersal of pathogens over a concentrated population area. Characteristics that make a specific pathogen a high-risk for bioterrorism include a low infective dose, ability to be aerosolized, high contagiousness, and survival in a variety of environmental conditions. The most dangerous potential bioterrorism agents include the microorganisms that produce anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox. Other diseases of interest to bioterrorism include brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis, Q fever, and viral encephalitis. Food safety and water safety threats are another area of concern.

Animal biowarfare research: historical perspective and potential future attacks.

A biological attack on livestock or poultry could result in the loss of valuable animals, costs related to the containment of outbreaks and the disposal of carcasses, lost trade and other economic effects involving suppliers, transporters, distributors and restaurants; however, it is not possible to secure all livestock, and livestock are much less well guarded than human targets. Thus, the vulnerability of the livestock industry to the introduction of biological agents varies for the following reasons: (i) the majority of lethal and contagious biological agents are environmentally resilient, endemic in foreign countries and harmless to humans, making it easier for terrorists to acquire, handle and deploy these pathogens, (ii) with animals concentrated in fewer production facilities and frequently transported between these facilities, a single pathogen introduction could cause widespread infection and (iii) the extent of human travel around the globe makes it difficult to exclude exotic animal diseases as possible biological agents. Historically, many governments have developed and planned to use biological agents for direct attacks on livestock or poultry. In the past, developed nations have actively developed biological weapons to target animals. The potential spectrum of bioterrorism ranges from isolated acts against individuals by individuals to tactical and strategic military attacks and state-sponsored international terrorism intended to cause mass casualties in animals, humans or both. This review provides an overview of the past development and use of biological weapons and describes potential future attacks.

Bioterrorism: intentional introduction of animal disease.

The possibility of the intentional introduction of animal disease as an act of bioterrorism adds a new dimension to the development of strategies for assessment, prevention, response and recovery from exotic diseases, including the zoonoses. The vulnerability of livestock operations, the likelihood of success, the possibility of the use of genetically engineered organisms and limited resources to handle multiple outbreaks place new pressures on policy-makers and emergency responders to make best use of limited resources. The methods for managing a natural occurrence or accidental introduction of high-consequence diseases are generally applicable to containment and recovery from outbreaks of intentionally introduced animal diseases. Zoonotic agents increase the complexity at both international and national levels. Modern biology provides both increased threat of new disease entities and methods for earlier and more effective detection and intervention. Improved methods are emerging for defining trade restrictions and animal movement and for determining when it is safe to resume normal trade.

Bioterrorism and invasive species.

The risk of dispersing invasive species, especially human pathogens, through acts of bioterrorism, cannot be neglected. However, that risk appears quite low in comparison with the risk of dispersing animal pathogens that could dramatically burden the agricultural economy of food animal producing countries, such as Australia and countries in Europe and North and South America. Although it is not directly related to bioterrorism, the intentional release of non-native species, particularly undesired companion animals or wildlife, may also have a major economic impact on the environment and, possibly, on animal and human health, in the case of accidental release of zoonotic agents.

Biological warfare agents.

Biological warfare agents are a group of pathogens and toxins of biological origin that can be potentially misused for military or criminal purposes. The present review attempts to summarize necessary knowledge about biological warfare agents. The historical aspects, examples of applications of these agents such as anthrax letters, biological weapons impact, a summary of biological warfare agents and epidemiology of infections are described. The last section tries to estimate future trends in research on biological warfare agents.

Bioterrorism versus radiological terrorism: notes from a bio/nuclear epidemiologist.

The antiterrorism and disaster planning communities often speak of the high potential for bioterrorism and possible potential for radioterrorism, specifically the explosion of a fission device on US soil. Information gained from an epidemiologist's work in the national and international scene, which inevitably involves Intel regarding the cultures and subcultures being studied, suggest that bioterrorism is far less likely to be a major threat, that has been over-emphasized at the state level due to warnings from Homeland Security, and that Homeland Security itself appears biased toward bioterrorism of late with very little available rational basis.